

THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN JOINT OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. In the wake of the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, the EU faces a complex task to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. The requirement for the EU to establish and maintain highly capable and flexible Command and Control arrangements is a fundamental prerequisite for the management of all EU military missions. In addition, European nations need to configure their forces to develop the military implementation of the Headline Goal over the coming years. To assist this process and the formulation of future EU military policy, there is a need to define the maritime dimension of European joint military capability.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to identify the contribution that maritime forces can make in support of EU-led operations.

SCOPE

3. The paper considers the philosophy of a combined and joint approach to future European crisis management activity and examines the ways that the potential Commander of an EU-led non-military or military operation can exploit the unique characteristics of maritime forces.

4. This paper provides broad guidance on how a maritime component of a European joint force may be generated, the requirement for access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities, the options for command and the requirement to train maritime forces for EU-led joint crisis management operations.

5. This document should be considered as a living document to be improved over time as experience is gained.

6. A glossary of terms and definitions is at Annex A.

JOINT APPROACH TO FUTURE MILITARY ACTIVITY

7. Members of the EU are committed to creating a balanced and coherent pool of forces capable of operating effectively in combined and joint operations across a range of crisis management tasks¹. By doing so, nations have recognised that jointness, along with multi-nationality, is a key principle in Europe's military capabilities. Air, land and maritime forces should not be regarded as separate entities, but as part of and indivisible from other components of a Joint Force. The Operation Commander will

¹ Petersberg Tasks

determine the actual capability of a Joint Force and the mix of air, land and maritime forces required for a given mission.

8. There is thus a much wider role for maritime forces than simply the pursuit of maritime campaign objectives: their utility is in contributing effectively as a component of a joint campaign, whose main effects will invariably be focussed on land. Even where the challenges are land-heavy, all dimensions of warfare must be efficiently exploited to support the mission. However, to be effective it is important that potential commanders and their staffs are fully familiar with combined and joint capabilities and fully trained in joint operations, so that they are able to identify, plan for and exploit the overall military effect. Jointness, properly inculcated, planned, exercised and executed, is a concept that must drive European force development, planning and operations if the EU is to meet the political and military targets it has set.

JOINT MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF EU NON-MILITARY OPERATIONS

9. It is possible that future crisis management operations may be conducted without the prime use of military capabilities. Nevertheless, military capabilities may be critical enablers for the success of non-military EU operations. Examples include the use of military capabilities to provide humanitarian aid, hospital and casualty reception facilities, support to policing activities and capabilities to mount a rescue mission. While this paper illustrates the maritime dimension of European joint operations across the spectrum of crisis management tasks, the potential contribution that the maritime component can make to non-military operations is identified wherever possible.

MARITIME CAPABILITIES

10. The key attributes of maritime capabilities are tactical self-sufficiency, independence from host nation support and a long reach². They can deploy, withdraw and re-deploy simply by exercising freedom of navigation thereby giving political and operational decision makers a wide range of operational choices without the need to make a decisive and often irreversible commitment to a course of action or exit plan. In a joint operation the maritime component, which includes maritime air, amphibious and land forces, can provide a capacity for a number of options ranging from assistance to non-military operations to high intensity warfare. These capabilities can also be swiftly and flexibly moulded together to suit a task.

11. For non-military operations, joint capabilities that the maritime component can assist in providing include forward operating bases, air transport, reconnaissance, force protection³, command facilities, sealift, stores depots, accommodation, hospitals, refuge havens and much else besides. The maritime component has particular utility in

² Reach - The ability to operate for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support.

³ Force Protection - This can extend to providing protection to military and non-military participants in an EU-led operation as well as installations and infrastructure

humanitarian, evacuation and rescue tasks, especially when access to roads, airports or other forms of transport is disrupted.

12. If military operations are required, the maritime component of a joint force can additionally contribute to and support combat forces engaged in peacemaking and peace enforcement operations with a wide range of combat air power, fire support, reconnaissance, force protection and strategic lift.

13. All these capabilities can be provided without crossing national boundaries, without the political restrictions often coupled with host nation support and avoiding the force protection risks associated with static land based support facilities.

14. The following 6 capability 'quality' areas offer a suitable baseline against which to assess in greater detail the spectrum of operational choices that the maritime component of a joint force can offer the Operation Commander of an EU-led non-military or military operation.

Deployability and Mobility

15. Although early entry forces can often be inserted most rapidly by air, sea-based forces provide the quickest means of deploying a logistically self-sustaining and tactically coherent force over long distances with minimum risk. They are able to transit to and arrive in the Area of Influence in fully operational mode and already acclimatised to the conditions. They can do so overtly or covertly and can poise⁴ if required. Once in the vicinity, maritime forces can remain for long periods of time and if necessary are able to undertake precursor operations⁵ to enable the free movement of strategic lift bringing stronger ground forces and logistics support.

16. Early arrival of a maritime force offshore is valuable in the preliminary stages of an emerging crisis, where timely influence, coercion⁶ or military intervention may help to prevent deterioration into conflict. The mere presence of a maritime force can be a significant factor in preventing or containing a crisis.

Effective Engagement

17. Sea-based forces can establish long-term presence, exert extended deterrence and can be ready for crisis response while minimising the need for host nation support and force protection. An appropriately configured maritime force is capable of conducting a range of tasks including humanitarian aid, disaster relief, Search and

⁴ Poise - An attribute of a maritime force which permits it to remain in international waters for long periods while retaining the ability to become engaged in events ashore or withdraw without risk of embroilment

⁵ Precursor operations - An advance operation to eliminate enemy sea denial forces such as submarines, fast attack craft and mines from the path of the main force, a holding area or amphibious objective area

⁶ Coercion - The use of force, or the threat of force to persuade an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour, against his wishes

Rescue, evacuation, surveillance and intelligence gathering, policing, embargo and sanction enforcement, protection of Sea Lines of Communication⁷, power projection, force protection, logistic and medical support, command and control, amphibious operations, mine clearance and inshore operations. In the event of an EU-led operation requiring early action to stabilise a crisis, maritime forces can swiftly provide light entry forces and, if required, heavier, sustainable ground manoeuvre units supported by naval fire support, air defence and close air support.

18. If tasks involving combat forces are required, a maritime force is likely to be preceded by submarines, which can be moved quietly and unannounced into position before a situation develops into a crisis. Some submarines now have the ability to launch Land Attack Cruise Missiles, and many can carry out the clandestine insertion of Special Forces and gather information and intelligence. Submarines can provide early presence, a capacity for coercion and can feature strongly in any potential adversary's calculations at both the operational and tactical levels.

19. The maritime force that follows will be configured to operate from the sea, under the sea, over the sea, onto the land and over the land. It will possess an advanced command and control capability to facilitate power projection. As well as sea-launched Land Attack Cruise Missiles from ships and submarines, aircraft and helicopter carriers can provide organic capability for strike, interdiction and battlefield support as well as air defence and information gathering.

20. Amphibious capabilities enable the Operation Commander to exploit the sea to complement and support manoeuvre on the ground thus adding to the options for intervention while pressurising, complicating and constraining an adversary's military options⁸. In particular, the inherent mobility of amphibious forces can allow the Operation Commander to concentrate effort at a time and place of his choosing. The presence of a landing force immediately available offshore can also be of great value to an Operation Commander as a reserve in theatre that can rapidly back-up personnel ashore in the event of a deteriorating situation. This can allow the Operation Commander to reduce the political and military visibility of the operation by maintaining a minimum footprint in country and with a minimum logistics tail.

Protection and Survivability

21. The protection and survivability of forces engaged in an EU-led operation will be a crucial consideration in both political and strategic planning and decision-making. Maritime forces can contribute significantly to the wider protection of non-military and military operations. In particular, sea-based fire support, air power, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, target acquisition and reinforcement capability offer

⁷ Sea Lines of Communication - The sea routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations and along which supplies and reinforcements move. The expression is sometimes used more broadly in a strategic sense to include commercial shipping routes.

⁸ The European Amphibious Initiative is developing further the overall capability of European amphibious forces by improving the level of co-operation and interoperability of existing forces.

the Force Commander significant additional Force Protection⁹. The presence of strategic lift and amphibious capabilities, particularly support helicopters operating from ships, also offers the Operation Commander a range of options for withdrawal of forces or evacuation and rescue operations.

22. Sea-based forces will themselves normally enjoy a high degree of integral Force Protection using organic means. Additionally, operating at sea reduces their vulnerability to asymmetric warfare and terrorism.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

23. Maritime forces are able to provide rotary and fixed wing air assets operating from mobile platforms that can undertake surveillance and reconnaissance tasks for both non-military and military operations. Such capability is of value to a Commander to scope the requirement for and subsequently to undertake humanitarian aid, disaster relief, Search and Rescue and evacuation tasks. Maritime units can also contribute to the production of a coherent intelligence picture through Signals, Human, Electronic, Acoustic and Communications Intelligence sources, typically from forward-deployed maritime platforms without infringing national boundaries. In particular, forward-deployed submarines can provide early indicators and warnings of a developing crisis and thus an early indication of the need to deploy follow-on elements.

Command, Control, Communications and Information (C3I)

24. Effective Command and Control, properly supported by a joint operations planning process, is essential to the success of operations. Command and Control capabilities for the Force Commander of an EU-led operation can be provided by maritime units in theatre for the initial stages of the operation, where speed of reaction and the effective collation, management and use of information are paramount.

25. Some maritime units are configured as sea-based headquarters providing the full range of command functions of a Force Headquarters. Indeed, commanders of non-military or military operations should consider the benefits of conducting some or even all elements of even modest campaigns from a sea based platform, particularly when the infrastructure is poor or extensive force protection measures are required ashore. A ship can provide self-contained facilities including highly effective joined up command and control, intelligence processing, communications, planning spaces, accommodation, media handling and a flight deck. A Headquarters can form very quickly and operate seamlessly from the same platform either operating just offshore, alongside or even from a host nation without the need for a complex support infrastructure. This is particularly valuable during military operations involving precursor operations, combat and peace enforcement.

26. To enable effective Command and Control (C2) across the full spectrum of joint operations the EU C2 structure requires a robust, extensively networked and fully

⁹ Sea based theatre ballistic missile defence will contribute to force protection in future years

integrated command, control and communications organisation. Improving European maritime information exchange capabilities, particularly with non-NATO EU maritime forces, is a key issue.

Sustainability, Logistics and General Support

27. The vast majority of joint logistic support by volume for any non-military or military operation, even at relatively small scale, will be transported by sea for all or part of the journey. Safe and timely delivery of such support will require secure Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC), protected maritime holding areas in theatre, and secure means of delivery, either through established port facilities or by Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore transit systems where adequate port facilities do not exist. The Operation Commander may require a maritime force to provide escorts for substantial volumes of logistics shipping, to contribute to the defence and operation of the destination ports in the theatre of operations and to provide a mine countermeasures capability.

28. Maritime forces are in themselves largely self-sustaining with organic logistic support that enables them to operate independently of shore support for prolonged periods, thus allowing the Operation Commander considerable freedom of action in his deployment options. Such independence is particularly valuable in the early stages of a campaign when logistic re-supply may not be fully established.

29. Even when logistic re-supply is established, there are advantages to maintaining a largely sea-based logistics support system for non-military or military operations, particularly when the infrastructure is poor or extensive protection measures are required ashore. This includes the provision of medical facilities, repair organisations and accommodation. The presence of maritime forces can therefore enable the deployment of leaner manpower ashore while retaining a logistically self-sustaining, sea-based power projection capability in reserve.

GENERATION OF MARITIME FORCES FOR EUROPEAN OPERATIONS

30. European maritime forces regularly train, exercise and operate together in combined and joint operations. In addition, national training is routinely conducted using common NATO-based doctrine, concepts and procedures. This allows individual units and formations to be easily and quickly integrated into combined formations.

31. Existing national or multinational forces are likely to form the nucleus of a maritime force for an EU-led operation utilising capability-based force packages as building blocks for the creation of combined formations that are task orientated and tailored to the requirements of the specific mission. Individual force packages should be operationally ready and quickly available and will normally have their own identifiable command arrangements. As a result the overall force may be brought together reasonably swiftly and quickly worked up. This approach enables all participating countries to offer elements and the system envisaged is such that non-EU elements may be easily embraced.

32. The Operation Commander can therefore expect to have a combined and integrated maritime force quickly available that may meet the needs of an EU-led operation in the framework of Petersberg missions, including appropriate command and control arrangements.

33. There are advantages to despatching a substantial maritime force to the Area of Influence particularly in the early stages of a developing crisis when the required full scale of effort is not yet known. If deployed overtly, it sends a very strong political signal. It also maximises the options that are available to an Operation Commander. The force can always be recalled without infringing any national boundaries and without having committed forces on to the ground.

ACCESS TO NATO'S ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES

34. In conducting an operation, the EU will have to determine, according to the requirements of the case, whether it will conduct operations with or without recourse to NATO's assets and capabilities¹⁰. The extent to which such access will be required to support the maritime component of joint operations, if at all, will depend on the nature of the mission rather than the size of the force. NATO has the ability to provide the full range of maritime command and control assets and capabilities to cover the needs for an EU-led operation in the framework of Petersberg missions. Maritime Component HQs, subordinate to the Force Headquarter (FHQ), may come from Alliance HQs or, like the forces comprising the components, be provided by Member States. Generally, from the maritime perspective, access to NATO's assets and capabilities is likely to be required for the more challenging crisis management tasks to ensure effective planning and command and control of units assigned.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A EUROPEAN MARITIME FORCE

35. Command and control of maritime forces is exercised through common doctrine and procedures using compatible CIS capabilities. Command of the maritime component for small-scale crisis management tasks may be assigned to the senior officer present or to a deployable national joint HQ as appropriate. Command and control of maritime forces during such operations, may be exercised from platforms equipped with a command capacity in addition to their normal operational capability.

36. The EU has recourse to the maritime HQs and associated command platforms listed in the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC). However, in certain operations in which the most important criteria is urgency, such as evacuations, a "framework nation" or "lead nation" may be utilised, enabling the EU to mount multinational operations at relatively short notice by using a national HQ enhanced from contributing nations.

¹⁰ The release of NATO's planning capabilities, command and control facilities and other commonly funded capabilities for an EU-led operation is subject to NAC approval. This will be sought on a case by case basis following consultation between the PSC and the NAC, taking EUMC advice into account

37. Depending on the circumstances, a Force Headquarters may be built up from the nucleus of a single service Headquarters. This would be appropriate in less complex operations, particularly where there is only one component. From the maritime perspective, it would be useful to base the Force Headquarters around the maritime component for a primarily maritime operation and it may be worth considering this option for more challenging joint scenarios. Indeed, some amphibious commanders (CCLF and CCATF)¹¹ are familiar with maritime and air capabilities and have the capacity to command land forces at up to the level of 3 full Brigades. Such commanders have significant joint credentials and may be suitable for consideration for appointment as the Force Commander.

38. For more complex joint operations, Command and Control (C2) of the maritime component will need to be exercised through a Maritime Component Commander (MCC), normally deployed in theatre, either afloat or ashore. Criteria for selection of the MCC are that they should:

- a. Be deployable and operational within the required timeframe.
- b. Have adequate command and CIS capabilities with suitable connectivity with superior and subordinate commands (and connectivity with other Component Commanders as required).
- c. Have the necessary expertise to direct maritime forces across the spectrum of maritime air, surface, subsurface and amphibious operations and be able to provide prolonged command and control over assigned maritime forces for the entire spectrum of anticipated maritime operations.

39. A number of options exist for command of maritime forces engaged in an EU-led operation. Given the likely nature and scope of tasks, it is envisaged that a sea-going commander drawn from a national or multi-national HQ or from NATO's Force Structure will command maritime forces. Options for command of maritime forces at MCC level include the NATO High Readiness Force (Maritime) (HRF(M)) HQs and suitable national or multinational Force HQs.

- a. Once operational, the HRF(M) HQs will provide formed and tested multinational HQs that are part of the NATO Force Structure and will be regularly exercised during NATO exercises. Recourse to such multinational HQs offers the EU immediate access to a multinational operational instrument, disposing of a high degree of interoperability through practised common doctrines, procedures and language in day-to-day work.
- b. Other national or multi-national Force HQs may be suitable to function as MCC. In considering these options the possible release of assets from non-EU NATO Allies for use during an EU-led operation should not be discounted.

¹¹ CCLF – Commander Combined Landing Force
CCATF – Commander Combined Amphibious Task Force

40. The selection of MCC for a particular operation cannot be anticipated in advance. The nature, location, scale and general circumstances of the operation will influence the choice by the EU of Operation Headquarter (OHQ), FHQ or Component Command HQs from those that have been offered. The type of operation, level of contribution by individual nations, and whether it is predominantly land, air or maritime orientated will also be a factor in the selection of HQs for the task. From a maritime perspective, more detailed criteria will need to be developed and agreed between EU Member States for the selection of maritime HQs. The criteria should include:

- a. The ability of the HQ to plan and conduct specific types of operation.
- b. The capability of the HQ to meet the specific readiness criteria for such an operation.
- c. The capability of a HQ to provide a core staff able to integrate augmentees, including those from contributing nations (modules and individuals).
- d. The compatibility of command, control and communications among all HQs in the proposed chain of command.
- e. The existence of standing and proven agreements concerning manning, training and communications.

SUPPORT AND TRAINING

41. Headquarters to support a maritime force engaged in an EU-led operation already exist in the NATO Command and Force Structures. These include the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), for which a potential role in European-led operations is explicitly envisaged¹². NATO HQs that have the necessary expertise to host or provide maritime support to an Operation HQ for predominantly maritime operations include SACLANT, RHQ EASTLANT/HQ NAVNORTH, RHQ SOUTHLANT and HQ NAVSOUTH.

42. The EU has identified¹³ that a range of exercises will be necessary to ensure that all levels of the chain of command from the Political and Security Committee (PSC)/EU Military Committee (EUMC) down to the level of Force Headquarters (FHQ) (whether provided by Member States – national and multi-national headquarters – or NATO) are exercised in accordance with crisis management procedures. Such exercises should complement and be transparent with crisis management exercises run by other organisations to ensure economy of resources and avoid duplication of effort. Exercises of national and multi-national forces below this level will remain the responsibility of Member States, but may be conducted within the framework of NATO's command structure and/or NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP).

¹² MC 389/1, June 2000.

¹³ Exercise Policy of the European Union.

43. Given the range of operations that European nations may wish to undertake, the variety of force and command options that are available and the likely nature of the NATO-EU relationship, it is important that forces and their associated C2 structures are exercised regularly in Petersberg tasks. This includes exercising potentially available NATO, multinational and national HQs and other organisations capable of providing training and support.

CONCLUSIONS

44. Conclusions are:

a. A joint approach to future European military activity is essential if the EU is to meet the political and military targets it has set. Potential Commanders and their staffs must be fully familiar with combined and joint capabilities and fully trained in joint operations if they are to be able to identify, plan for and exploit the overall military effect.

b. European maritime forces are already well placed, in terms of both operational concepts and capabilities, to contribute positively to European joint non-military or military operations. In particular, their inherent advantages of mobility, flexible configuration and employment, and scalable power projection offer valuable options to the Operation Commander for the effective conduct of joint operations.

c. Maritime forces regularly train, exercise and operate together in multinational and joint operations and there is a well-proven system for quickly integrating them into combined formations using capability based force packages as building blocks. The Operation Commander can expect to have a combined and integrated maritime force quickly available that may be employed across the entire mission spectrum.

d. There are benefits in sea-basing the Force HQ and/or land component HQ particularly in the early stages of a mission, especially if the infrastructure is poor or extensive force protection measures are required ashore.

e. Improving European maritime information exchange capabilities, particularly with non-NATO EU maritime forces, is a key issue.

f. There are political and military advantages to despatching a substantial maritime force to the theatre of operations, particularly during the early stages of a developing crisis when the required full scale of effort is not yet known.

g. The extent to which access to NATO's assets and capabilities will be required to support the maritime component will depend on the nature of the mission rather than the size of the force. In general, access may be required for

the more challenging crisis management tasks to ensure effective planning and command and control of units assigned.

h. More detailed criteria will need to be developed and agreed for the selection of maritime HQs for EU-led operations.

i. It is important that forces are exercised regularly in Petersberg tasks including the exercise of potentially available NATO, multinational and national HQs and other organisations capable of providing training and support.

Annex:

A. Glossary of Terms and Definitions

ANNEX A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

In preparing this document, EU terms and definitions have been used where appropriate. Where no EU definition exists, NATO terms and definitions have been used.

TERM	DEFINITION	REF
Area of Influence	A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command and control	AJP1(A)
Combined Force	A force composed of elements of two or more nations	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Combined Joint Task Force	A combined Joint Task Force is a multi-national (combined) and multi-service (joint) task force, task-organised and formed for the full range of Alliance's military missions, which require multi-national and multi-service command and control by CJTF HQ. It may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations.	NATO MC 389/1
Combined Operation	An operation conducted by forces of two or more EU Member States acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Command and Control (C2)	The authority, responsibilities and activities of a military commander in the direction and co-ordination of military forces and in the implementation of orders related to the execution of operations	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
EU-led military Operation	An operation conducted under the political control and strategic direction of the European Union. It may be an operation with or without recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities.	
European Forces	National or multinational European forces that are available to the EU for the conduct of EU-led operations. Many of these will also be declared to NATO.	

Force Commander	<p>The commander of an EU force acting under the authority of the Operation Commander to execute a military operation and authorised to exercise operational control over assigned forces within a designated area of operations.</p> <p>The Force Commander will be located at the Force Headquarters deployed in theatre, ashore or afloat, is responsible for the planning at operational level and conduct of the operation in theatre. He will be subordinate to the Operation Commander and is responsible for developing the OPLAN at his level and issuing the Operation Order (OPORD)</p>	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Force Headquarters (FHQ)	The headquarters of an EU force deployed to the area of operations	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Joint	Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of at least two services participate.	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Maritime Component Commander (MCC)	<p>A commander, designated by the Force Commander or higher authority, responsible for making recommendations to the Force Commander on the employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating maritime operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him.</p> <p>The maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander.</p>	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Maritime Forces	Those forces employed in maritime operations (including forces on, above and under the sea) to gain or exploit command of the sea, sea control or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea.	See Note 1

Operation Commander	A commander outside the area of operations nominated by the EU Council to conduct a defined operation and authorised to exercise operational command or operational control over allocated forces. The Operation Commander will be located at the HQ identified to be the Operation Headquarter and is responsible for planning the mounting and the conduct of a joint operation at the military strategic level of command. He will interact with the CEUMC and EUMC respectively. In particular, he is responsible for the development of the CONOPS and the OPLAN, force generation process and the conduct, deployment and termination of the operation. He will receive the Operational Command (OPCOM) or Operational Control (OPCON) of units by Transfer of Authority, although full command of the forces is always retained by the nations to whom those forces belong.	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Operation Headquarter (OHQ)	The static, out-of-area headquarters of the Operation Commander, which is responsible for building up, launching, sustaining and recovering an EU force	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Petersberg Tasks	Tasks to be conducted under the authority of the EU. - humanitarian and rescue tasks - peacekeeping tasks - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1
Transfer of Authority	Act by which national authorities officially transfer the command and/or control of their national forces to the EU Operation Commander	EUMC 11/1/01 Revision 1

Notes:

1. As defined in the Bi-SC Paper - Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept - The Maritime Dimension - dated 18 Jul 01