

**NAVAL UTILITY COUNTERING  
ASYMMETRIC THREATS  
(NUCAT)**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Chiefs of the European Navies initiated a strand of work focussed on Naval Utility for Countering Asymmetric Threats (NUCAT) because of concerns that Europe and its interests are targets for asymmetric actions by terrorists. The **aim** is to identify and articulate the utility of Naval Forces as part of an overall integrated joint and combined interagency strategy to counter asymmetric threats.

Worldwide, democratic societies have been directly influenced in recent years by the emergence of the asymmetric threats. While the threat itself may often be tactical in nature, it can have a devastating grand strategic outcome. The sea around Europe hosts a variety of opportunities the targeting of which has the potential for serious security, economic and ecological outcomes. The sea also provides an avenue of approach to the heart of Europe for terrorist attacks.

In Europe the indiscriminate nature of the asymmetric threat has necessitated the development of and support for a broad range of activities and initiatives with a focus on security in the maritime environment. These include the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, the European Security Strategy, the Maritime Borders Initiatives, the International Shipping and Port Facility Security Code, the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, the Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research and the European Security and Defence policy.

Countering asymmetric threats in the maritime environment requires deterring the potential threats, defeating the existing ones and minimising their effects when and where they occur. Naval Forces are but one arrow in the maritime security architecture. Their enduring attributes **of Flexibility, Versatility, Mobility, Self Sustainment, Expeditionary Capability, Joint Nature, Command and Control, Poise and Availability** together with their sovereign status can be used effectively to counter threats. Using the sea can help bring the threat away from the European shoreline countering it in an environment that is least likely to undermine European interests. More exercises while sharpening Europe's response mechanism, also provide an opportunity for publicity serving as deterrence to aggressors.

Within Europe while a number of States already have a joined up approach to dealing with maritime security issues more could be done particularly at an intra and inter-State level. Building on current initiatives, improving intelligence and information sharing and leveraging of European institutions will lead to greater Naval utility in countering asymmetric threats. In the future developing doctrine and ultimately looking at future concepts will be required. Ultimately the institutionalisation of the solutions necessary might be achieved through an appropriate cross pillar framework such as a naval asymmetric working group under the European Union military staff. The mechanism could have strong links with the European Council appointed Counter Terrorism Co-ordinator & other maritime security service providers. The creation of a strategic-operational level, recognised maritime picture (S-O RMP) perhaps coordinated by the European Union Satellite Centre should be a goal.

For centuries Europe's navies have provided security over the horizon, today. Today, in collaboration with all other State actors with a maritime security remit they are ready to demonstrate their utility, thinking globally, acting locally, but with the capability to go wherever decision makers require countering the threat.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Background**

In May 2001 the Chiefs of the European Navies (CHENS) discussed how to demonstrate maritime utility in a joint European Union (EU) context in the wake of the Helsinki Headline Goals. To this end a strand of work was commissioned called the European Maritime Initiative (EMI).

The aim of EMI was to assist the EU to understand the contribution that European Maritime forces can make to EU-led Joint Operations and thereby help to guide the development of EU military policy papers. The first paper, Maritime Dimension of European Joint Operations (MDEJO), led to two follow on streams under the EMI umbrella each building on the principles articulated in the MDEJO with a view to either turning the concepts into reality or providing food for thought on the utility of Naval Forces.

### **Generic European Maritime Concept of Operations (GEMCO).**

The first of these initiatives chose to use a methodology that applied the principles of the MDEJO to a scenario based on "Separation of Parties by Forces". This represents the upper level of the Petersberg tasks, utilizing the forces identified in the Helsinki Headline Goal process, to produce a Generic European Maritime Concept of Operations.

### **NUCAT.**

The second of these initiatives was prioritised as a consequence of the Admirals growing concerns with the risks arising from asymmetric threats in the maritime environment and the desire to articulate Naval Utility Countering Asymmetric Threats (NUCAT).

### **AIM**

Within the scope of the Maritime Dimension of European Joint Operations this paper aims to identify and articulate the utility of Naval Forces as part of an overall integrated joint and combined interagency strategy to counter asymmetric threats.

### **Scope**

The paper is primarily aimed at decision takers in the EU establishment and maritime security service providers with a national and international remit. To facilitate understanding and appeal to non-military institutions it does not necessarily use military language throughout. It will focus on the maritime environment and the asymmetric threat within the framework of current international/EU policy and developing trends. By necessity the scope will be cross pillar involving the Common Foreign and Security Policy second pillar and third pillar issues of police, judicial and criminal matters.

## **THE NATURE OF THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT**

Worldwide, democratic societies have been directly influenced in recent years by the emergence of the phenomenon known as “the asymmetric threat”. The menace to today’s society arising from asymmetric threats defines this as a danger which while sometimes tactical in nature can be grand strategic in outcome. The perpetrators seeking an asymmetric advantage do not adhere to a common set of rules or values, disregarding international laws and regulations and employing illegal methods such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and suicide attacks. Taking advantage of the openness and freedom of action provided by political and judicial systems in western democracies they attempt to exploit the inter-jurisdictional and other seams wherever they are to be found. The dark side of globalization allows multinational criminal syndicates to broaden their range of operations from drug and arms trafficking to money laundering and trafficking in human beings, sometimes masking other activity such as trans-national terrorism. They use the revolution in communications developments and the ease of international travel to facilitate their activities. They target both military and civilian objectives in pursuance of tactical, operational, strategic or political goals. The threats are difficult to detect, identify and hence to neutralise or defeat.

### **Asymmetric Threats to The Maritime Environment**

The type of threats in the maritime environment are varied and the following are but a few examples of the targets and manner in which a protagonist may focus on the sea in pursuit of an asymmetric advantage.

- Support activities for terrorist groups in the maritime environment through smuggling of weapons of all kinds including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and hazardous materials, the movement of terrorist personnel into target areas, fund-raising through drugs trade, human trafficking and intelligence gathering.
  - Strategic shipping carrying high value and specialist cargoes as a well as hydrocarbon products as a target in its own right or a weapon to affect maximum damage. The effects from ecological and financial perspectives, even when there is no terrorist involvement, can be seen in the outcomes arising from incidents such as the ERIKA (1999), the IEVOLI SUN (2000) and the PRESTIGE (2002). Similarly the attack on the oil tanker LIMBURG near YEMEN serves as a clear example where there was terrorist intent.
  - Strategic chokepoints and infrastructures such as ports, platforms and international connectors including bridges, tunnels, pipelines and cables.
  - High density civilian targets such as liners, ferries and coastal tourist resorts
  - Attacks on Naval Forces at sea or in port such as the attack on the USS COLE;
- Since September 11th 2001, the potential in terms of the disproportionate effect from threats in the maritime environment has been brought into sharp focus. Whether the impact from these threats is felt at sea on land or in the air the importance of countering such threats and having an understanding of vulnerabilities and a strategy to counter them is of pivotal importance. The Madrid attacks of March 11th 2004 were a stark reminder that international terror can have catastrophic effects exploiting the opportunities afforded by globalisation and open societies.

## **THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT CURRENT STATUS AND DEVELOPING TRENDS**

The sea around Europe is a major strategic asset and any action to undermine its legitimate use has the potential to have serious economic and security consequences on the vital interests of Europe. Close to 80% of international trade at over five billion tonnes of goods, expanding at a rate of 5% per annum travels by sea. With a forecast by some observers pointing towards a tripling of maritime traffic in the period 2000-2020 the opportunities for and the impact of disruption is set to increase significantly. While much of this traffic will be internationally trade orientated much is also focussed on tourism and leisure with both a surge in the number of leisure craft and a significant increase in cruise liners, many carrying several thousand passengers. Exploitation of maritime resources around the European coast has continued a pace with oil and gas production increasing each year while the potential in terms of mineral and aggregate extraction coupled with other forms of development such as bio-prospecting is also growing. The increase in development in marine based sustainable energy initiatives is resulting in an increase in the types and level of near and offshore high value installations. UN reports predict significant global population growth of the order of a 50% increase by 2050 with the overwhelming proportion of this in third world countries. The desire for more opportunities results in a population drift towards the sea with over 50% of the earth's population within 60km of the coast where the majority of economic and industrial centres are located.

In examining Naval utility for countering asymmetric threats in the maritime environment it is considered important to first look at the characteristics of the threat and how limiting boundaries might be re-established. Policy initiatives with either a marine related security or monitoring dimension should be highlighted and closely looked at to ensure coherency. Enduring naval attributes and privileges on the high seas should be considered in the context of an integrated approach.

### **Characteristics of the Threat & Re-Establishing Boundaries.**

Principles employed by those seeking an asymmetric advantage include, infiltration, surprise, being non-conventional and a vision that is focussed on undermining the will to counter by creating mass disruption, social fatigue and fear. Proponents often remain invisible, sometimes receiving support from third parties and even rogue as well as failing States, whose uncontrolled territory can breed and sustain international terrorists. Those seeking an asymmetric advantage will focus on the vulnerabilities of the national and international community. These vulnerabilities include the dependency on state-of-the-art information systems, the respect for law and freedom associated with democratic regimes and the impact of globalisation making national interests protection difficult. The task of forces for law and order is thus to endeavour to re-establish those limits, in order to be able to engage the opponent on equal terms.

### **Key Aspects of the Developing Security Framework**

In Europe the indiscriminate nature of the asymmetric threat has led to the development of and support for a broad range of activities and initiatives, many of which, have a focus on security in the maritime environment. The geostrategic/ economic importance of improved security has resulted in a range of policy and other initiatives at a European and international level. Some aimed at improving maritime security or providing opportunities for such improvement include:

**Declaration on Combating Terrorism.**

The European Council Declaration on combating terrorism in the aftermath of the Madrid bombing pointed towards the need for progress and action in a number of areas. Many of the areas are of significance in the context of the thrust of this paper. In particular the Council called for simplification of information and intelligence exchange between law enforcement authorities. It calls for reinforcing operational cooperation and maximising the effectiveness of information systems as well as actions to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control. It also pointed towards improved mechanisms for cooperation and the promotion of effective collaboration between police, security and intelligence services.

**European Security Strategy (ESS)**

The key issues, which are asymmetric in character articulated in the ESS, include organised crime, terrorism, WMD, failed States and regional conflicts. In so far as it applies to countering asymmetric threats the ESS supports thinking globally while acting locally, contributing to conflict prevention and striving for greater multilateral co-operation.

**Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research.**

The report calls for a focus on interoperability, connectivity and standardisation as key elements of cross border and inter service co-operation for security. It recommends that the gap between civil and defence research should be bridged and it calls for the establishment of a Security Research Advisory Board. The final report of the Group of Personalities was presented to the commission in March 2004 and it is expected it will lead to a Communication to the Council.

**Global Monitoring of Environment and Security (GMES).**

The potential value from this European initiative is significant. The recognition of the need for more joined up solutions in the area of security is underpinned by GMES and it is clear that there is a particular emphasis on maritime security. It is also clear that maritime security is a cross pillar issue that must be addressed from a cross pillar perspective. Providing security services in the maritime environment is also the business of Naval Forces and European navies have much to contribute to success in this area.

**EU Maritime Border Initiative.**

Policing of Europe's maritime borders is articulated in a plethora of European policy briefs. The burden associated with this task is great and can only be managed by a truly combined and joint trans-national response involving the police, customs, coastguards and a variety of other State actors. European Naval Forces already in effect provide in-situ monitoring of Europe's maritime borders. They are continuously forward deployed exercising freedom of navigation on the high seas. They offer political and operational decision makers a wide and flexible range of operational choices. These choices are made without the need to make a decisive and often irreversible commitment to a course of action.

**International legal issues and developments.**

The implementation of the International Shipping and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Amendments 2002 on 1 July of 2004 will enhance the security of shipping and ports worldwide. While the ISPS Code is primarily applied in territorial waters, its utility in terms of enhancing security on the high seas is subject to interpretation. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), currently under review together with other initiatives focussed on WMD will further enhance the maritime legal framework in this area. The improved security culture in the shipping and port industries will be complemented by European navies, which in support of the civil authority are poised to respond when security threats arise. Navies will exploit time and space to counter these threats in a wide area from the shore line to the high seas in the main far from European population centres and high value targets.

**ESDP & EU Military Staff.**

The draft European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its combined nature for an effective response will provide the policy framework that will facilitate greater inter-agency collaboration. The potential role of the EU Military Staff in the EU Secretariat and operating as part of an EU cross pillar spectrum of integrated multi-disciplinary resources for crisis management has the potential to house a Naval Asymmetric Working Group with a focus of facilitating greater co-ordination.

**Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T)**

The Partnership for Peace initiative, Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T), could be examined in greater detail by European Navies as a means of enabling greater co-ordinated effort.

**Related Areas.**

Customs & Excise EU-wide Co-operation, which includes monitoring shipping activity for smuggling in the maritime approaches to the EU has a part to play in an integrated solution. Other areas such as fisheries policy, where the value of the data sets and regime already in place, could contribute to the establishment of a recognised maritime picture for European waters.

Lack of coherency and inadequate co-ordination provides a major seam to be exploited by those seeking an asymmetric advantage. The need to achieve interoperability, connectivity and standardisation are common themes that must be addressed in the developing security framework.

## **THE UTILITY, VERSATILITY AND POTENTIAL OF NAVAL FORCES FOR MARITIME SECURITY**

Countering asymmetric threats in the maritime environment requires defeating the existing threats, deterring the potential ones, and minimising their effects when and where they occur. The MDEJO paper highlighted the importance and benefit of the freedom of the seas as a facility for the expression and use of naval power. It outlined the flexibility of Naval Forces as expressions of political will and as a component of joint operations. Key to countering asymmetric threats will be a streamlined interagency National and International security system. Naval Forces are but one arrow in this architecture. Their enduring attributes have particular utility. They have a long tradition operating in a joint and multinational framework enhancing interoperability, and furthering joint training. Prevention tasks are furthered by presence patrols, sea control, maritime interdiction operations (MIO) as well as protecting merchant shipping and offshore facilities. Containment tasks undertaken by Naval Forces include using force to neutralise terrorist actions where appropriate. Whatever the response framework and which ever is the lead institution, when countering asymmetric threats it is important for decision takers to have an appreciation of capabilities that give Navies utility. The timely application of these capabilities in aid or in support of non-naval institutions may well prove to be pivotal in countering a potent threat with an asymmetric intent. Drawing on the capabilities already articulated in the Maritime Dimension of European Joint Operations it is possible to re-articulate these in the context of their utility in countering asymmetric threats. In particular examination of the quality areas in support of the EU Helsinki Headline Goals provides a suitable framework within which to demonstrate and expand on Naval utility for countering asymmetric threats:

### **Deployability and Mobility.**

In the event of any EU operation requiring early action to counter an actual or perceived threat of an asymmetric nature Naval Forces have particular utility. They offer the quickest means of deploying a logistically self-sustaining and tactically coherent security force. They can do so overtly or covertly and can poise if required with the ability to remain on task for long periods of time, if required by decision makers. The mere presence of a maritime force can be a significant factor in preventing, deterring or containing a potential threat with asymmetric intent. Naval Forces unlike other agencies with responsibility in this area can operate away from European Shorelines.

### **Effective Engagement.**

An appropriately configured maritime force is capable of conducting a range of tasks including surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, policing, patrolling, maritime interdiction operations, protection of sea lines of communications, choke points and hub port approaches. Maritime forces are also capable of both surge and Command and Control operations. If necessary submarines can move quietly and unannounced into position gathering information and intelligence and providing early presence.

### **Protection and Survivability.**

The protection and survivability of forces engaged in EU-led operations can be

enhanced by the use of sea based intelligence surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets as well as force protection measures. The availability of a wide manoeuvre space, operating at sea in itself reduces the vulnerability to asymmetric attack and terrorism.

#### **Command Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. (C4ISR)**

Effective Command and Control, where necessary, properly supported by a joint, combined planning process with inter-agency input is essential to the success of operations. In the maritime environment from the outset, naval platforms provide self-contained facilities for highly effective joint up operations. A headquarters can form very quickly and operate seamlessly from a naval platform with accommodation and communications facilities suited to the requirements of other agencies with a lead authority or remit in the area. Navies are to forefront in developments in networked enabled capability. Joint planning networks with real or near real time data and tracking supported by link technology can enable the recognised maritime picture that is essential for action wherever and whenever it is required in the maritime domain. In brief the ability of Naval Forces using C4ISR architecture to present decision makers with a Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) and courses of action are indicative of just some of the unique contributions Naval Forces can make compared to other actors.

#### **Versatility.**

Naval Forces are inherently versatile. In the context of this paper it is considered important to appreciate the utility of Naval Forces where an asymmetric type attack against a land target has been effective. Warships can be used to deliver a variety of vital services and support measures. Examples include “damage control type” operations, provision of a command and control capability, provision of humanitarian relief (including specialist medical or engineering services) as well as the provision of a NBC citadel if required. In addition to these enduring attributes Naval Forces enjoy certain privileges and legal standing in the maritime environment that adds to their utility in countering asymmetric threats.

#### **The Status of Warship and Regulation of the High Seas.**

The status of warships makes them the closest thing to the expression of sovereign territory on the high seas. According to A.P. Higgins “warships represent the sovereignty and independence of their State more fully than anything else can represent it on the ocean; they can be met only by their equals there, and equals cannot exercise jurisdiction over equals. The jurisdiction of their own State over them is therefore exclusive under all circumstances and any act of interference with them by a foreign State is an act of war.” Warships are also built for survivability in a hostile environment. These attributes have established warships as the superior legal and physical presence on the high seas.

#### **Right of Approach and Visit.**

On the high seas and outside territorial waters the primacy status of warships

combined with the characteristics of Naval Forces provides the logical means for the maintenance of law and order. Under International law a warship enjoys the right to approach a vessel on the high seas with a view to establishing its identity, also see UNCLOS par 108, 110 and 111. The right of visit may be exercised in certain exceptional circumstances but is subject to the policy of the warship's flag State in addition other legal influences such as the Vienna and Palermo protocols and the consent of the Flag State of the vessel of interest.

#### **Building on current initiatives.**

A wide range of activities is already de-facto contributing to countering asymmetric threats. The mere passive presence of Naval Forces undertaking sovereignty patrols is an example. Naval presence with the capacity to loiter for extended periods is a deterrence, which also facilitates poise for timely deployment to the right area where direct military action and/or policing action to neutralise a pending threat is required. The co-ordination of European response against illegal trafficking through the establishment of Regional Maritime Co-ordination Centres for maritime border surveillance is already progressing in some areas. Even the co-ordinated effort in policing European fisheries is a building block on which greater added value could be achieved. The provision of maritime security services in choke points such as the Straits of Gibraltar together with other multi national efforts are examples of complimentary activities already in place. Developments with automatic identification systems are already facilitating the realisation of a recognised maritime picture. Similarly, improvement of access to data bases with sharing of information and establishing adequate communication channels, taking advantage of available technology with layered secured access using virtual private networks are important.

#### **INTEGRATION AND CO-ORDINATION OF RESPONSE**

For historical reasons, depending on the system of government and administration the primary national agency responsible for responding in the maritime environment will vary from country to country. Within Europe, each State has absolute sovereignty within its internal waters and territorial seas. The means and platforms used to maintain that sovereignty are a matter for the State. Beyond the territorial seas States enjoy a range of sovereign rights and have particular responsibilities that extend to the limits of their economic zones and beyond.

At a national level the role of national Naval Forces extends onto the shore. The number of national agencies involved in regulation, while differing from State to State, increases as the area of interest moves towards the shore. The primacy of the directing agency will depend on the particular regulations being enforced. Naval forces through their capacity for exerting dominance of the area of operations and their tradition, in some cases, of working with other agencies, have much to contribute to the key task of integrating and co-ordinating the national/international response to the asymmetric threat in the maritime area.

While the geographical location of the threat will be pivotal in deciding the type of response, the decision-making framework for dealing with potential threats should ideally be cross cutting. As already articulated, those seeking an asymmetric advantage will aim to exploit the inter-jurisdictional seams that exist between States and the inter-organisational seams that will exist between State security actors at a

national level. Pivotal towards countering the asymmetric threat will be the goal of achieving greater integration and co-ordination of response at a national level and at a European level between States.

Within Europe a number of States have already identified the need for a joined up approach to dealing with maritime security issues. In some cases a framework already exists pulling together the principle maritime security service providers each leveraging off the other. From a European perspective, more can be done between States with a view to plugging the inter-jurisdictional seams and providing an effective counter to the asymmetric threat, particularly in the maritime environment. Navies have a great deal to offer in this regard. Their long-standing tradition of operating in the international environment and working together is a foundation on which a broader framework may be fashioned. Bearing in mind the capabilities already articulated, their versatility and their international legal standing, Naval Forces have the potential to provide the centre of gravity to a truly co-ordinated inter-agency multi national response to European focussed asymmetric threats. In seeking a harmonised European response a number of issues are worthy of consideration:

**The requirement for focused operational intelligence.**

The following features of the marine environment dictate that the availability of good intelligence is critical to the effective deployment of seagoing assets for security purposes:

- The size of the maritime environment;
- The diverse nature of the activity in it;
- The critical link of all activity at sea to activity ashore;
- The time and space for deployment and redeployment of assets

These features also broaden the nature of the good intelligence required. In contrast to conventional naval warfare the opponent seeking an asymmetric advantage is unconventional and often not clearly identified. In these circumstances the integration of naval intelligence with other related intelligence is recognised as a critical factor for effective deployment of resources against asymmetric threats. The broader sources and the focused intelligence output assists in the key process of re-establishing boundaries by which the threat may be engaged and neutralised. Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners. Clearly the achievement of a European Intelligence oriented, strategic-operational level, Recognised Maritime Picture (S-O RMP) should be the goal.

**Co-ordination of Activities.**

Co-ordination of activities, which will enhance our capacity to counter asymmetric threats, must be viewed from a national and European perspective.

**National Co-ordination.**

From a national perspective measures that will improve co-ordination of a response are important. The establishment of joint inter-agency structures of State actors with a maritime security remit would seem important where they do not exist already. Inter-agency personnel and

information exchange; training and exercises together with the development of appropriate protocols will all further enhance coordination. In these areas Naval Forces have contributions to make.

#### **European Co-ordination.**

European activities that have a bearing on aspects of maritime security have a role to play in achieving greater co-ordination. The Global Monitoring of Environment and Security should go to the heart of an improved response. The products arising out of the European Union Satellite Centre (EU SC) and the manner in which they are streamlined for Maritime Security users will also have a bearing on Europe's capacity to respond. Indeed the EU SC could have a key co-ordinating role in the creation of the strategic-operational level, Recognised Maritime Picture (S-O RMP) using a virtual private network for distribution with a layered security access. European Navies could thus be actively engaged in the integration and running of the S-O RMP. Once again international inter-agency personnel and information exchange, training and exercises will all further enhance co-ordination. While navies are already involved in a raft of activities with a combined and joint military emphasis there are opportunities for greater interagency involvement at regional & European levels.

#### **Generation and co-ordination of assets.**

Already within Europe a number of regional mechanisms exist which facilitate the generation of Naval Forces. European maritime forces regularly train, exercise and operate together in multi-national and joint operations. If naval utility to counter asymmetric threats is to be maximised a qualitative shift in force generation may be required with an emphasis on timely response, balanced capability and multi agency involvement. European Navies need to develop mechanisms that facilitate more rapid reaction. In the first instance this should be built on existing arrangements. From a general perspective a mentoring relationship between Navies could be productive as part of an overall move to enhanced utility. The role of the EU Military Staff as part of the EU Secretariat, which operates as part of a EU spectrum of integrated multidisciplinary resources for crisis management, will have particular relevance.

Bearing in mind the cross pillar nature of the response required it would be important that force generation is executed from the perspectives of pillar 2 and pillar 3. At a European level the creation of the "Naval Asymmetric Working Group" under the umbrella of the EU MS has significant potential. Such a working group could have strong links with the European Council appointed Counter Terrorism Co-ordinator. A mechanism to provide for inputs from other maritime security service providers to the working group could be created.

#### **From doctrine to new concepts.**

Maximising the value of naval utility for countering asymmetric threats should be examined from the perspectives of now and the future:

##### **Doctrine.**

Refining doctrine relating to how capabilities are currently being utilised needs to be an iterative process. Similarly reviewing how inter-agency co-ordination

can be improved from the perspective of current organisational models needs to be undertaken.

### **Future Concepts.**

Looking to the future building on initiatives like Global Monitoring of Environment and Security (GMES) future naval concepts need to consider the types of capabilities and future organisational structures that will facilitate greater trans national inter- agency co-ordination. This will require research and development at national and European levels. It will also require more streamlining of legal regimes applicable to the waters around Europe.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The maritime environment presents those seeking an asymmetric advantage with an avenue of approach to the heart of Europe. For this reason, Naval Forces must be prepared not just to react but also to collaborate with other agencies to counteract these threats. This collaboration should be driven at national and European levels. There are wide ranges of vulnerabilities in the maritime scenario, which are difficult to counter. Stressing co-operation among nations will reduce these vulnerabilities. Naval Forces intrinsic characteristics and strengths, while potent, are not enough to counter these threats. It is necessary to improve on areas like harmonisation of the legal framework and co-operation, especially in the intelligence area. It is also necessary to raise visibility of Naval Forces in countering asymmetric threats and improve interoperability.

A wide range of Naval related activities is already de-facto contributing to countering asymmetric threats. Naval Forces undertaking sovereignty patrols and their presence with the capacity to loiter for extended periods, while deterrence, also facilitates poise for rapid response. A multi national joint inter-agency approach in which Naval Forces play a key role facilitating and using their enduring attributes of Flexibility, Mobility, Self Sustainment, Expeditionary Capability, Joint Nature, Command and Control, Availability and versatility is essential if Europe is to counter asymmetric threats in the maritime environment. Greater use of exercises while sharpening Europe's response mechanism will also provide an opportunity for greater publicity of Naval activities and also serve as a deterrence.

The maritime environment presents both challenges and opportunities. Challenges in attempting to recognise where threats might next arise, opportunities in facilitating a wide manoeuvre space that presents the possibility of countering the threat far away from the European homeland.

Ultimately the institutionalisation of the cross cutting solutions necessary might be achieved through an appropriate cross pillar framework leveraging off EU institutions that already exist. To achieve this a number of possibilities exist and these include:

- The creation of a strategic-operational level, Recognised Maritime Picture (SO RMP) possibly co-ordinated by the European Union Satellite Centre.
- The creation of a naval asymmetric working group under the EU military staff with links to the Counter Terrorism Co-ordinator & others.
- Greater orientation of doctrine & future concepts to gain & retain the initiative

This paper has articulated the utility of Europe's Naval Forces to counter the asymmetric threat. These forces are poised and ready to work with European agencies with a maritime security remit. Streamlining the protocols to facilitate such inter- agency co-operation is a national responsibility where they do not already exist. Facilitating the co-ordinated European response in the maritime environment is an area where a lot good work has been done but there is a lot more to do. The Chiefs of the European Navies have generated this paper not as an academic exercise to be read and filed but rather as a reflection of their concern and as a "blueprint" that could lead to the attainment of even more effective action, res, non verba.

**ANNEX A  
GLOSSARY OF TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND  
REFERENCES**

**Agency (agencies):** In the context of this organisation(s) with a national or European institutionalised security remit such as the European Union Satellite Centre, Europol, police, customs, coastguards, as well as intelligence services.

**Asymmetric threat:** A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result. (1/10/2003)

**Capability:** In the context of this paper attribute that enables or contributes to the achievement of an objective.

**Combined operation:** An operation conducted by forces of two or more EU Member States acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**Cross pillar:** In EU Community parlance reference is often made to the three pillars of the EU Treaty. In the context of this paper matters of mutual concern falling under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar) and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (third pillar).

**Declaration on Combating Terrorism:** Declaration on combating terrorism was issued by the European Council on 25 March 2004 in the aftermath of the Madrid Terrorist attacks.

**European Security Strategy (ESS):** The European Security Strategy was adopted by the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003.

**Global Monitoring for Environment and Security:** Joint initiative of the European Space Agency and the EC.

**Interoperability:** The ability of forces to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. (Adapted from AAP-6)

**Inter-agency:** The relationship between more than one agency

**Intra-agency:** Relationships between elements within the same agency

**Joint:** Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate.

**Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research:** A European Commission initiative invited by the European Parliament and submitted on 15 March 2004.

**Policy coherence:** The goal of avoiding a policy mismatch in different policy initiatives relating to the same area.

**Palermo Protocol:** Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Trans-national Organised Crime.

**Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP):** A real time, or near real time maritime picture in which all activity is identified.

**Security services.** In the context of this document this reference relates to the delivery of security type services.

**Trans-national:** Issues affecting more than one State.

**UNCLOS 2:** United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 1982 – ratified in 1994.

**Utility:** Usefulness in achieving a particular aim or contributing to a particular objective.

**Vienna Protocol:** Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.